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That famous literary lawyer, W. S. Gilbert, loved to poke fun at the
establishment. No true Gilbertian will ever forget the Lord Chancellor
in Iolanthe:
The law is the true embodiment
Of everything that's excellent
It has no kind of fault or flaw
And I, my Lords, embody the law.
SEC Rule 10b-5 (the Rule)' as interpreted by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (the Commission) and the federal courts may (as
some fear) or may not come to "embody the law" of fiduciary responsi-
bility in respect of corporate "insiders." It may or may not supersede
long-standing state law doctrines, and preempt the field of federal
securities regulation, at least in a wide area of litigation based on claim
of "fraud." It is certain, however, that the trend of decision under the
Rule has produced deep schism between "liberal" and "conservative"
elements of the corporate bar.2 While Professor Bromberg's title reflects
a broader sweep, the book itself has a more modest scope. It is designed
to provide a guide through the labyrinth of decision under the Rule,
1. 17 CI.R. § 240.lob-5 (1968). (The text of the Rule appears several times in this book).
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices. It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any, means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of a national securities exchange,
(1) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
2. Cf. Gilbert's Private Willis, parliamentary sentry:
I often think it comical...
That ev'ry boy and ev'ry gal
That's born into this world alive
Is either a little Liberal
Or else a little Conservative.
lolanthe, Act II.
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both for lawyers and (perhaps in deference to the publisher of Business
Week, who also published this book) for the executive.
There are indeed, as Professor Bromberg tells us, "anti-fraud" pro-
visions other than the Rule in the federal securities laws. Notably,
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,2 (the 1933 Act) declares it
to be "unlawful" for any person, "in the offer or sale of any securities,"
by use of what have come to be termed "the jurisdictional means,"4
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
the purchaser.5
Breach of Clause 2 results in statutory civil liability under either
Section 11(a) or Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act;0 and if securities are
registered or in course of registration under that Act, there is an addi-
tional administrative sanction in the form of a "stop order" issuable by
the Commission after notice and hearing.7 No specific statutory civil
remedy is spelled out for violation of Clause 1 or Clause 3, nor for
the protection of the defrauded seller of securities.
So the law remained until 1942, when the Commission suddenly con-
fronted these lacunae and Rule 10b-5 was born. The history is brief.
The draftsman of the Rule retold it recently:
It was one day in the year 1943 [sic], I believe. I was sitting in my
office in the S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call
from Jim Treanor who was then the Director of the Trading and
Exchange Division. He said, "I have just been on the telephone
with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional Administra-
tor in Boston, "and he has told me about the president of some
company in Boston who is going around buying up the stock of
his company from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he
has been telling them that the company is doing very badly,
whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and will
be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there anything we can do
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
4. These are: "any means or instruments of transportation or communication in Inter.
state commerce or... the mails." Id.
5. The several "anti-fraud" provisions are diagrammed in A. BROMBERc, SECURITIES LAWI
FRAUD: SEC RuLE lOb-5 (1967) [hereinafter cited as BROMBEC]. BPoMBER § 2.1, at 16-17.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a) and 1(2) (1964).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1964).
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about it?" So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I
looked at Section 10(b)s and I look at Section 17, and I put them
together, and the only discussion we had there was where "in
connection with the purchase or sale" should be, and we decided
it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I
don't remember whether we got there that morning or after lunch.
We passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All the
commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table, indi-
cating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike who
said, 'Well," he said, "we are against fraud aren't we?" That is
how it happened.9 [Citation added.]
The Commission first publicly relied on the Rule in 1943 in reporting
its investigation into the attempt of Ward La France Truck Corpora-
tion to purchase a substantial amount of its outstanding shares without
making adequate disclosure to the prospective sellers of its current
favorable financial condition and business prospects.1 0
More recent decisions underscore the Commission's imaginative use
of the Rule since 1943. In 1961, disciplinary action was brought against
the brokerage firm of Cady, Roberts &. Co. for dealing in the market
without disclosing unfavorable information whili an associate acquired
in his capacity as a director of the Company whose shares were sold."1
In 1966, the Commission appeared as plaintiff in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.12 seeking civil relief on behalf of sellers of Texas Gulf
shares against the company and various of its officers, directors, and
employees who, without adequately disclosing the discovery of a major
ore body, either bought share themselves or suggested that others buy
them.13
8. This is § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (commonly known as the 1934
Act), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964) which declares it unlawful
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipu.
lative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
9. The Committee on Federal Securities Regulation of the ABA Section on Corpo-
ration, Banking and Business Law held a Conference on Codification of the Federal Secur-
ities Laws in the fall of 1966. An edited transcript appears in 22 Bus. LAw. 793 (1967). The
quotation is from a statement by Milton V. Freeman at 922.
10. Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (reprinted in Bro:,mmc App. D).
11. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (reprinted in Bnosmrc App. E).
12. 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). By stipulation, no decision was rendered as to
the standing of the Commission as a proper party plaintiff. At this writing the cause is
pending on appeal, and the Court of Appeals has announced that it will consider it en
banc. Doc. No. 30882 (2d Cir., May 2, 1968).
13. Professor Louis Loss has dubbed these "friends" and "friends of friends" "tippees."
See Cary, Israels and Loss, Recent Developments in Securities Regulation, 63 CoLUm. L.
REv. 856, 867 (1963).
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The essence of the legal standard which the Commission believes the
insider is required to meet is probably best expressed in Chairman
Cary's much quoted opinion in Cady, Roberts & Co.:
We, and the courts have consistently held that insiders must dis-
close material facts which are known to them by virtue of their
position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal
and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment....
If, on the other hand, disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or
sale would be improper or unrealistic under the circumstances,
we believe the alternative is to forego the transaction.14
The statement seems simple and clear. But by the time Chairman Gary
wrote it in 1961 there had been a thirteen-year history of civil litigation
and judicial opinions defining the scope and purpose of the Rule.
Mr. Freeman, one of the Rule's draftsmen, "never thought that
twenty-odd years later it would be the biggest thing that had ever
happened."'5r Just how "big" it is in terms of its significance in the
entire scheme of federal securities regulation may be the subject of
some argument. That litigation under the Rule continues to increase
in volume and that its importance is still growing admits of no debate.
Almost every weekly issue of the CCH Federal Securities Law Reporter
bears this out. As Mr. Freeman puts it, the Rule
was intended to give the Commission power to deal with this
problem [of the defendant seller]. It had no relation in the Com-
mission's contemplation to private proceedings. How it got into
private proceedings was by the ingenuity of members of the private
Bar starting with the Kardon case.' 0 It has been developed by the
private lawyers ... with the assistance of, or if you don't like it,
connivance of the federal judiciary, who thought this was a very
fine fundamental idea and that it should be extended.17 [Citation
added.]
Today, Professor Bromberg suggests that:
... lOb-5 is generating almost as much litigation as all the other
general antifraud provisions together, and several times as much as
the express liabilities. It is by now such a dominant factor in pri-
vate securities litigation that one is surprised when it does not
14. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
15. Freeman, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967).
16. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1947); subsequent opin.
ions appear at 73 F. Supp. 798 (EM. Pa. 1947) and 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
17. Freeman, 22 Bus. LAw 793, 922 (1967).
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turn up, and a court does not hesitate to introduce it as a major
consideration if plaintiff fails to plead it.8
Interestingly enough, the law is mainly based on district court decisions,
supported by a few court of appeals opinions but without a word from
the Supreme Court. Moreover the decisions are mainly on the plead-
ings. "Thus the typical lOb-5 'victory' is only a holding that a cause of
action has been stated, good enough to withstand a motion to dismiss."10
What Professor Bromberg does in his book is to take the text of the
Rule and break it down into its three clauses (corresponding, as he
points out, to those of Section 17 of the 1933 Act20) and cast up the
decisions against them in terms of the characteristics of the transaction
in issue. These transactions he classifies as
1. Direct-Personal Dealing
(a) Face-To-Face Transactions, Other than With Broker-
Dealers;
(b) Broker-Dealers;
2. Direct-Impersonal Dealing (Mergers, Tender Offers, etc.);
3. Indirect-Impersonal Dealing (Stock Exchange and Open-
Market Trades).21
He then analyzes the same material in terms of the elements of cause
of action and defense, such as materiality, scienter, whether plaintiff
is a buyer or seller, etc. It is in these areas that the Rule has been extra-
polated so far that the decisions have created an entire structure of
federal law dealing with the fiduciary responsibilities of corporate in-
siders. No experienced practitioner of federal securities law is without
pronounced views on what should be the scope and impact of the Rule. -22
The questions are many. Let me select for brief discussion a few
which to me seem both fundamental and controversial.
1. Civil Remedy. Sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 ActC provide
civil remedies for the deceived buyer of securities sold by means of a
"prospectus"2 4 which was "misleading," that is, inaccurate or incomplete
18. BROmBEaG § 2.5(6), at 45-46 [footnotes omitted].
19. BRomERG § 1.3(2), at 10.
20. Quoted at p. 1586 supra.
21. The classification appears in the chapter headings of tro.NMr.M pt. 2, "Rule lOb-5
in Operation."
22. Compare generally Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Cor-
porations by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. RMv. 185 (19641) with Fleischer,
"Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HAav. L. REv. 1146 (1965).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k and 1(2) (1964).
24. With specified exceptions the term means "any prospectus, notice, circular, ad-
vertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any
security for sale or confirms the sale of any security .... " Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10).
15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1964). Thus it includes many forms of communication other than the
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in any material respect. If the prospectus is part of a registration state-
ment which has become effective under the Act, the cause of action
arises under Section 11; if not, it arises under Section 12(2). Does (or
should) the buyer of a security, who would have a statutory and express
civil remedy under either of these Sections of the 1933 Act, also have
available a concurrent implied civil remedy under the Rule?
It cannot, of course, rationally be argued, that an implied right of
civil recovery under the Rule is not available to buyers, just because,
as we have seen, the Rule was formulated for the protection of sellers.
Thus the market purchaser of common shares who suffers a loss by
reason of reliance on a misleading prospectus as to preferred shares can
allege a "fraud" and thus state a cause of action under the Rule. Judge
Frank decided that such a buyer did have an implied civil remedy under
the Rule and, incidentally, denied a claim for recovery under Section 11
of the 1933 Act. He stated, in dictum, that since establishment of the
cause of action under the Rule required proof of "fraud" it was not
duplicative of an action under Section 11 and could therefore exist
concurrently.2 This dictum has been widely relied upon and cited for
the proposition that a defrauded purchaser may have, on the same facts,
both an express remedy under the 1933 Act and an implied remedy
under the Rule, and as overruling two earlier district court decisions to
the contrary.26 In Professor Bromberg's view, these decisions "can no
longer be regarded as valid. '" 21 I respectfully demur, and point for
support to a very recent decision,28 Jordon Building Corp. v. Doyle
O'Connor & Co., Inc.20 The Jordon opinion can be interpreted as
denying that the federal courts have any power to create an implied
cause of action under the Rule in favor of a purchaser. It seems to me,
however, that J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,30 which settled a conflict between
circuits in favor of an implied civil remedy for breach of the Com-
mission's proxy rules, clearly negates such a broad interpretation.
Certainly a cause of action under the Rule may properly be implied in
favor of either seller or buyer but that does not mean that where Con-
now familiar booklet by which an issue of securities registered under the 1933 Act is
offered for sale.
25. " . . . when, to conduct actionable under § 11 of the 1933 Act, there is added the
ingredient of fraud, then that conduct becomes actionable under [the Rule]." Fischman
v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951).
26. Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Rosen-
berg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
27. BROMBERG § 2.4(2) n.76, at 34.
28. Decided after the publication of Professor Bromberg's book.
29. [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,996, at 96,382 (N.D. 111.
1967).
30. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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gress has created for the defaulted buyer an express civil remedy the
federal courts can validly imply an additional remedy under the Rule
on the same substantive facts (using the word "substantive" advisedly).
2. Statute of Limitations. Section 13 of the 1933 Act3' imposes a
three year statute of limitations on actions under Sections 11 and 12 of
the Act. All too many suits have been brought-and countenanced-
under the Rule rather than under the 1933 Act in order to take ad-
vantage of the ingrown notion that, since no express statute of limita-
tions is applicable, the court must look for analogous statutes of limita-
tion and must find them in state law, where the periods are generally
longer than three years. Professor Bromberg urges the application of a
uniform three year statute.32 I agree. Indeed, I question the basis for
the mechanical process generally found in the judicial exegesis, even on
precedent. The first federal cases applying state statutes of limitation
did so when it was the statutory duty of the federal courts, absent
applicable federal statutes, to apply the law, both substantive and pro-
cedural, of the state wherein they sat. The court would characterize the
action at bar, and, if Congress had not provided a specific period of
limitation, or otherwise made the state statute inapplicable, to apply
the most nearly analogous state statute.33
In Campbell v. Haverhill,4 a patent infringement case, the state
statute of limitations was applied in an action based on a federally
created right. The court stated that it believed it reasonable to presume
that Congress intended the remedy to be enforced within the same
period as similar actions within the state.35 But is any such argument
fairly applicable in the field of federal securities regulation? If we
are looking for the fair interpretation of congressional intent concerning
the statute of limitations applicable to a cause of action established by
federal law, and Congress has enacted a specific three-year statute cover-
ing an important area within the same field of regulation, does not that
statute prima facie provide the most-if not the only-"reasonable"
analogy? I suggest that what we see here is slavish devotion to stare
decisis without critical appraisal of the historical reason for the prece-
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964).
32. BROAME.G § 12.9, at 284. See Schulman, Statutes of Limitations in 10b-5 Actions:
Complication Added to Confusion, 13 WrAY.,NE L. REv. 635 (1957).
33. McCluny v. Sillman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830) is an early and typical example.
34. 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
35. Compare Judge Friendly's recent struggle with the application of federal or state
rules concerning the effect of concealing a cause of action where the case arose under § 4
of the Clayton Act which at that time contained no period of limitation. Movie-Color, Ltd.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 868 U.S. 821 (1951).
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dents. For some time Professor Loss has been citing in lecture a
case 6 in which the Supreme Court, absent a specifically applicable
federal statute, found the most valuable analogy in another federal
enactment.
37
In a recent labor relations case38 the Supreme Court again relied upon
state law to determine the applicable statute of limitations. Mr.
Justice White dissented, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, and
urged that
Certain principles are undisputed in this case. The period of
limitations for § 301 is to be determined by federal law; and, since
Congress had made no express provision for any time limitation,
this Court must fashion the governing rule. By adopting the statutes
of the several States, the Court creates 50 or more different statutes
of limitations rather than fashioning a uniform rule after con-
sideration of relevant federal and state statutes....
But here there is no dispute concerning whether a statute of
limitations is to be fashioned-the choice is between one statute or
50. If the Court is to develop the substantive law of labor contracts,
which it has undertaken to do with the blessing of Congress, it
seems odd that the Court should balk at establishing a single
limitations period, drawn from any of the sources available to it,
including the relevant federal and state statutes. I undertake no
such canvass here, but think the Court should do so.39
Substitute the phrase "securities regulation" for "labor contracts"
in Mr. Justice White's final paragraph and you have the point in bold-
face. As I see it there is something more than incongruity in the present
posture. In effect the implied cause of action for the enforcement of a
federally created right, which under Section 27 of the 1934 Act40 can
be enforced only in the federal courts, survives under state statutes of
limitations for a longer period than an express cause of action under the
1933 Act as to which the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction. 41
3. Scienter. As Professor Bromberg points out2 there is decisional
law supporting the proposition that at least under Clause 2 of the
36. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
37. See particularly the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, id. at 229, where
the point is clearly made that to find the period applicable to a maritime cause of action
based on the unseaworthiness of a vessel, the "ready and logical source to draw upon" Is
that provided by Congress in the Jones Act, 48 U.S.C. § 688 (1964), not a shorter period
derived by reference to state law as to limitation of actions based on negligence.
38. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
39. 383 US. 696, 709, 713-14 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
40. 15 US.C. § 78aa (1964).
41. Securities Act of 1933 § 22(a); 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1964).
42. BROMBm § 2.6(1) n.135, at 50. and § 8.9 n.102, at 223.
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Rule43 there is no requirement to prove intent to injure or even reck-
less disregard of the possibility or probability of injury; the Clause only
requires proof of "a material misstatement of fact or the omission of a
material fact." He suggests, however, that "[a] more balanced view,
better reflective of the current [trend] of decision is that recovery re-
quires, in addition, proof of an injury in some significant way con-
nected with the violation." 45 In other words, clear causal connection is
a minimal requirement.4" Professor Bromberg's own view, with which
I find myself again in agreement, is that there should be, if not scienter,
at least "a negligence standard, including [reasonable] foreseeability
of harm."47 Anything less would again create more than incongruity.
Even under Section 11 of the 1933 Act only the issuer is an insurer of
the accuracy of the registration statement.48 All other potential de-
fendants (directors and other signers of the registration statement, ex-
perts and underwriters) are given various types of defenses, which in
effect express for each a standard of care deemed by Congress fitting to
his economic function. 49 Under Section 12(2) of the same Act, even the
issuer may "sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such error or
omission."O
4. The Outer Limits? The Rule is not-indeed it cannot be-the
underpinning for a complete and rounded structure of federal cor-
porate law. The requirement of "connection with the purchase or sale
of any security" excludes the possibility. Where the transaction is in
43. Quoted at p. 1586 supra.
44. BROMBERG § 8.9, at 223, citing Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965);
Royal Air Properties Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962); and Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). The latter case, decided on the pleadings, was later dismi =-d
for lack of proof of misrepresentation, 828 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1964).
45. "The connective may be expressed in terms of causation, privity, or reliance."
BRoMBERG § 8.9, at 223.
46. Professor Bromberg finds this "implicit in the Rule's condition that the fraud be
'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.'" He cites Royal Air Properties,
Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d at 212, as "susceptible of this interpretation." Bno.r.nc § 8.9 n.103,
at 223.
47. BRoimraR § 2.6(1) n.132, at 50, citing witl apparent approal, Comment, 32 U.
CH. L REv. 824 (1965). The word "[reasonable]" is my addition. Id. n.1ssr at 51.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964). For an example of the potentially tough impact of that
liability see Franchard Corp. [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sc I- PRX. 5 77,113
at 82,038 (SEC 1964), where no one but the president of the issuer and possibly one minor
employee knew that the former was borrowing from the till. Following this opinion the
issuer and others contributed to a substantial court.approved settlement of class actions
brought under Section 11 and the Rule.
49. They are spelled out in § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964). Meeting the requirements
of the "due diligence" defenses afforded by the cited section is not easy of accompli nemntL
Reported decisions are few. Probably the most significant is that recently handed down by
District Judge McLean in the Southern District of New York on March 29, 1968. Ezcott v.
BarChris Constr. Corp., 4 CCH FED. Src. L. RE. V 92,179, at 96,827.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
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goods or services, or even cash or credits, for example, only state law
standards will be applicable, and once conflict of interest has been
shown, the result may well depend upon who bears the burden of proof
to establish "fairness." The salutary rule of Geddes v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co.,5' which places that burden on the defending fiduciary,
seems in danger of erosion both by statute52 and by decision.63 The
burden, when it must be borne by the plaintiff, can be substantially
more than a procedural roadblock.54 Litigation under the Rule usually
does not present questions of conflict of interest, and there can be no
doubt that a normal burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff; however,
as the state courts appear to be narrowing the outer limits of the fidu-
ciary duties of corporate insiders, the decisions under the Rule appear
to be extending them.
Within the federal ambit some fascinating questions arise, mostly
concerned with interpretation of the phrase "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." It seems that the plaintiff must be at
least a potential buyer or seller of securities 6 but extension of protec-
tion to the potential as distinct from the actual buyer or seller is com-
paratively new.6
Recent cases have granted injunctive relief, to prevent threatened
corporate manipulation,57 and have presumed the existence of a buyer-
51. 254 U.S. 590 (1921), followed in Shlensky v. South Parkway Building Corp.) 19 111.
2d 268, 280-81, 166 N.E2d 793, 801 (1960) and, until comparatively recently (see note 53
infra) in most other jurisdictions.
52. CAL. CoRp. CoDE § 820 (West 1954) has been the model for later enactments in other
states, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoR. LAw § 713(a) (McKinney 1967 Supp.). Delaware only recently
joined the parade. DEL. GEN. CoRe. LAW § 144 (West 1967). For an interesting discussion of
such statutes and their probable effectiveness, see Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus,
LAw. 35, 46-48 (1966).
53. Compare, e.g., Alliegro v. Pan Amer. Bk. of Miami, 136 So. 2d 656 (FIa. App, 1962),
a ffd, 149 So.2d 45 (1963), with Case v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 150, 256 NY.S,
2d 607, 204 N.E.2d 643 (1965).
54. Cf. Appellate Division and Court of Appeals decisions in Case v. New York Cent.
R.R. Co., 19 App. Div. 2d 383, 243 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1963), rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 150, 256 N.Y.S.2d
607, 204 N.E.2d 643 (1965). Law review comment on the Appellate Diviion decision will be
found at 74 YALE L.J. 348 (1964), and 49 CoRNELL L. Q. 520 (1964).
. 55. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Curtis Publishing Co., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCHI
FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 92,105, at 96,522 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (decided since publication of Bro"I.
berg) denied to holders of the Series A Debentures of Curtis the right to sue under the
Rule to restrain the offer of Series B Debentures to Curtis's preferred shareholders which,
plaintiff alleged, due to the substantial deterioration in Curtis' financial position over the
years since the offering of Series A, would seriously impair the "security" of the older
Series. The court deemed plaintiff not properly a buyer or seller for purposes of main.
taining an action under the Rule. The offer was subsequently withdrawn.
56. The best example is probably Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.
1967), cited in BRormERG § 6.3(5) n.55, at 123.
57. Two have come down since the publication of Bromberg. Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'g 266 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), cited In
BRo MBG § 6.3(3) n.35, at 118, and Puharich v. Borders Electronics Co., [1967.1968 Trans.
fer Binder] CCH FE. SEc. L. REP. 92,141, at 96,651 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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seller relationship and reliance on the part of the plaintiff shareholder
in a merger transaction. These broad interpretations of the scope of the
Rule highlight the recent amendment of the Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law eliminating dissenters' rights of appraisal in a merger or
consolidation situation where there is a public market for the securi-
ties.59 In general, the Delaware decisions not only require the minority
shareholder attacking a merger, consolidation or recapitalization to
allege and prove "fraud or illegality," but also define the terms narrowly.
In merger or consolidation cases the opinions have often pointed out
that the plaintiff has an alternative, and presumably adequate, remedy
through the appraisal procedure00 As Professor Bromberg points out,
"fraud" under the Rule as interpreted by the federal courts speaks
basically in terms of "equalization of bargaining position"0' and "is
closer to unfairness than to what either lawyers or laymen usually think
of as fraud." 62 This suggests, to me at least, that the Rule may soon be
invoked in a merger or consolidation proceeding in Delaware to attack
the fairness of the plan under Clause 1 or Clause 3 of the Rule, or under
Clause 2 combined with an attack on the accuracy of proxy material
under Borak.63 There can be no doubt that any merger or consolida-
tion involves a defined "sale" of securities,04 and the Commission's Rule
13365 exempts mergers or consolidations from being considered a "sale"
only for purposes of the registration and prospectus requirements of the
1933 Act and not for any other purpose. Certainly the transaction in-
volves a "purchase" of the securities of the surviving corporation by
those of the constituents, assuming that their rights and interests are
at all affected. If the insiders try to impose an unfair plan, for example,
by the weight of their own two-thirds voting power, where the remain-
58. Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Co., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965), cited and
discussed in BRo~MaERG § 6.3(2) n.32, at 117, and § 8.6(2) n.35, at 212.
59. Dart. GEN. CoRPs. L. § 262(k) (2 P-H CoRP. (July 3, 1967)). Unless the certificate of
incorporation provides otherwise, appraisal rights are denied when the issue is listed on a
national securities exchange, or is held of record by at least 2,000 holders. At this writing
it appears that Pennsylvania, at least, is gestating a similar enactment.
60. Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148 (1943), dearly articulates
the Delawvare courts' conception of "fraud." Reference to the appraisal remedy as effectively
exclusive absent such "fraud," will be found in Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 40 Del. Cli.
202, 178 A.2d 311 (1962), aff'd, 187 A.2d 78 (1962) and Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Chl.
80, 174 A.2d 29 (1961). To draw the contrast between Delaware and federal standards. see
Judge Leahy's opinion in Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943).
61. BROMmERG § 3.2, at 64, dting Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829
(D. Del. 1951).
62. BRo mERG § 1.1, at 5.
63. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
64. The definition appears in § 2(3) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(S) (1964). It in-
dudes any disposition for value.
65. 17 C.F.R. § 20.133 (1968).
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ing one-third of the shares are listed on an exchange or held by more
than 2,000 holders, the Rule may well offer succor, although under the
earlier Delaware cases there would be no hope.
Does a plaintiff have a good cause of action under the Rule if he
purchases securities after a defendant issuer has filed misleading data
with the Commission or published it to its security holders or to the
public generally, causing a rise in market price? The decisions-there
are three-seem to deny the plaintiff standing to sue. All were decided
in the Southern District of New York; at least one is pending on appeal
in the Second Circuit.66 Professor Bromberg appears to anticipate re-
versal. Indeed he characterizes the decisions in the two cases decided
before publication of this book as having "naively disregarded any
possible market impact as incidental." 67 Whether remedies under other
Sections of the 1934 Act are available in such cases is another matter.
Where reports are "filed" with the Commission as required by Section
13 of the 1934 Act 8 Professor Bromberg suggests an implied cause of
action, citing Miller v. Bargain City USA.', But Section 18 of the same
Act"0 creates an express civil remedy based on misleading statements
in reports filed with the Commission. Thus as to Form 10-K (the
Annual Report required under the 1934 Act), for example, there is no
need for implication. But annual reports to shareholders, reports to
stock exchanges, publicity releases to the general or the financial press,
advice to the statistical services all may contain material which sub-
stantially affects markets and which will be widely disseminated and
relied upon. None of this type of material is required to be "filed" with
the Commission. Although copies of the annual report to shareholders
are required to be mailed to the Commission, such transmission is
"solely for [the Commission's] information."71 This does not constitute
a "filing" and Section 18 is inapplicable. 2 Therefore, the Rule provides
the only available remedy for misleading statement-if remedy there is
to be.
66. The three cases are Heit v. Weitzen, 260 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Howard v.
Levine, 262 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); and most recently (decided after publication of
Bromberg) Mooney v. Vitolo, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. Ri'. 92,116,
at 96,545 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
67. BROMBERG § 7.2(2) n.41, at 151.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964).
69. 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964) (reprinted in BRONIBERG App. C).
71. SEC Rule 14a-3(c) under the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(c) (1968).
72. The Instructions for Form 10-K make the distinction by reference at the end of the
official form to "Supplemental Information to be Furnished," 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1968).
Its utility, for example, in allowing considerably wider latitude, as in appraisal of earnings
prospects and general discussion of the company's plans for the future, is reasonably
obvious.
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What about the defendants? Must they also be parties to a purchase or
sale of securities? Surely not, so long as there is clear causal connection
between the defendants' action (or inaction as the case may be) and an
actual or potential sale or purchase by the plaintiff. Thus, a claim
against directors for causing their corporation (plaintiff in a derivative
action) to make a sale of shares to a third party at an inadequate price
for the purpose of solidifying the defendants' control states a cause of
action under the Rule. 3
Must the defendants be "insiders"? Certainly not in tie sense that
limits the category to the issuer itself, its officers, directors or controlling
persons. Defendants may be liable under the Rule if they have access
to confidential information and misuse it. In Cady, Roberts & Co.J
liability was extended to an employer and in Texas Gulf Sulphur 3 to
employees fairly well down the line. It has also been suggested that the
Rule may furnish a basis for imposing liability on accountants who
are careless in their auditing procedures or in the manner of presenta-
tion of financial statements-at least on an "aider and abettor" theory
-and thus broaden the narrow doctrine of Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Niven & Co.,76 generally followed in the state courts. 7T
Finally, when does an "outsider" become an "insider"? Take the
case of individuals (or even corporations) who, for whatever purpose,
seek control of another enterprise. Usually the first step is quiet market
purchases of shares. Public "tender offers" often follow. In either con-
text the investment judgment of the potential seller may well be
affected by knowledge of the identity of his purchaser and the purpose
of his purchase. Pending legislation in Congress suggests that disclosure
is properly required when ten per cent of the outstanding issue has
been acquired or contracted to be acquired,7 8 in effect casting the
73. Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); cf. O'Neill N. Maytag.
339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), where recovery was denied because all the directors knew all
the facts of the corporate purchase (again from a third party); thus, said a majority of the
court, the corporation could not have been "deceived." The decision can be scriously
criticized and may well not stand up in the future. See, e.g., Israels, Corporate Purchase
of Its Own Shares-Are There New Overtones? 50 CoRNxu. L. Q. 620 (1963).
74. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). The director was a registered representative of the respondent
firm.
75. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Ul defendant
directors and officers were exonerated because their purchases had been made before, in
the court's judgment, the information had become sufficiently "hard" to warrant the
imposition on liability. This is, of course, a major issue on the pending appeal.
76. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
77. Note, Accountants' Liabilities for False and Misleading Financial Statements, 67
COLUMr. L REv. 1437 (1967).
78. S. 510, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., colloquially referred to as "the Williams Bill," was
passed by the Senate on August 30, 1967. It remains pending in the House.
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"outsider" as the "insider." The Commission has supported the legis-
lation, but it raises many fascinating questions which, if not determined
legislatively, will sooner or later reach the courts.
70
5. The Way Out? As Professor Bromberg states, "Few people are
content with lOb-5 as it is. Some would like to see it sharply curbed.
•.. Still others seek expansion .... My own position is in between.
*.."0 So, I think, is that of most experienced practitioners in the field,
no matter what their client orientation.
As Professor Bromberg suggests, there are three routes to reform:
legislation, amendment of the Rule, and judicial decision. Each has
its limitations. The legislative route is almost surely futile. One can all
too easily imagine the controversy certain to prevent attainment of the
substantial consensus between the Commission, the bar, and the securi-
ties industry which seems a prerequisite for Congressional action.8'
Amendment of the Rule is another matter. Here the Commission's
power is substantive. It could easily impose a standard of scienter or due
care.82 It could limit the application of the Rule to defined classes of
"insiders."' 3 Perhaps the Commission could deal with the problem of
overlapping causes of action by means of a provision that a state of facts
upon which a cause of action in favor of a buyer of securities could be
spelled out under Section 11(a) or Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act s4 or in
favor of either buyer or seller under Section 18 of the 1934 Act8" shall
not be deemed a violation of the Rule.
As to period of limitations, I suspect that the Commission is powerless
to legislate by rule. It cannot command the courts to create a cause of
action, nor can it negate one, 0 or deal in any effective manner with
79. See Brudney, A Note On Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RuTGERS L. Rav. 609
(1967).
80. BROMBERG § 12.9, at 283. For an excellent outline of some major areas of contro.
versy, see Henkel, Codification-Civil Liability under the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus.
LAw. 866 (1967).
81. That consensus was conspicuously present in 1964, and made possible the adoption
in that year of the so-called 1964 amendments, most importantly § 12(g) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1964), including in the registration requirements of that Act a large
number of "over-the-counter" companies. The amendments also subjected the companies
to the Commission's proxy rules, and their officers, directors, and ten per cent shareholders
to reporting requirements and accountability for short-swing profits under § 16, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p (1964).
82. Compare the phrase "with knowledge" in Rule 15cl-2 under the 1984 Act, 17 C.F.R,
§ 240.15cl-2 1968), reprinted in BRoMBERG App. C, at 304.
83. This is really a "many splendored word." It is not necessarily ecquivalent or limited
to the issuer itself (described by Professor Bromberg as "the most inside of Insiders,"
Bromberg § 6.4(1), at 125), nor to an officer, director, 10 per cent shareholder or "controlling
person" (as deflined in Rule 405 under the 1933 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) (1968).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a) and 1(2) (1964).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 87r (1964).
86. The attempt of the Comptroller of the Currency to do this in his proxy rules for
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purely procedural aspects. But the decisional route remains wide open,
and I suggest that the Commission as amicus curiae should mount a
powerful argument along the lines of Mr. Justice White's dissent in
UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.87 I would be sanguine as to the
eventual result.
How well this book performs its intended function wil depend
largely on which door the reader came in by. If he is a lawyer sophisti-
cated in the field, he will find much of interest, and something to ques-
tion, particularly when Professor Bromberg gets beyond encyclopedic
summary and analysis and into the area of judgment of policy and trend.
This is not to denigrate the utility of the encyclopedic aspect of the book.
It does assemble in one place "all the law there is." The practitioner
must then check through every issue of the CCH Federal Securities Law
Reporter subsequent to the last looseleaf supplement. Then, depending
on the correspondence between the facts before him and those of one or
more decided cases (which, as this book indicates, may go both ways on
the same point), he must reach the mature judgment necessary for an
opinion to be expressed to his client. How far this can be safely done by
the lawyer lacking years of experience and "feel" for the likely attitudes
of the Commission and the Courts will depend on the clarity of the
facts and applicable precedents. In my view the suggestion that this
book will have any genuine usefulness for the business executive is pure
publisher's propaganda. At most it waves a red flag that warns: "Don't
move without consulting counsel."
The general practitioner seeking education in the intricacies of the
Rule and the decisions under it will find help in this book. He will have
to read it from cover to cover and try to absorb a working knowledge of
the broad spectrum before he can safely advise a client in any except
the simplest of fact patterns-the equivalent of Kardon s or the like,
however, such phenomena cannot be classified as "non-recurring."19
CARLos L. IsiAris*
national banks promulgated under the 1934 Act, 31 Fed. Reg. 6949 (1956). seems an exer-
cise in tilting at windmills.
87. 383 U.S. 696, 709 (1966).
88. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
89. See, e.g., Schine v. Schine, 250 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Ross v. Licht, 263 F.
Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
A.B. Amherst College, 1925; LL.B. Columbia University, 1928. Member of the New
York bar, Adjunct Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
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